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4THE WAR PEAK: UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, CANADA,
GERMANY
In World War I the United States, Great Britain, andGermanydid not
add appreciably to their labor forces, the illusion of an over-all increase
having arisen from transfers out of domestic service and other paid em-
ployment to factories and shipyards.25 In all three countries the civilian
labor force was depleted by the full number drafted, and labor needed
in war work had to be pulled from the small pooi of prewar unemployed
or from industries turning out goods of less urgency.
During World War II, on the contrary, the labor forces unquestion-
ably increased (Chart 7), though the number varied widely among the
countries. Nonexistent in Germany unless one counts foreigners, and
Paper 14, pp. 39 if.
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Source: See text notes 5 and 6.substantial in Canada, in Britain. it was impressive though smaller than
usually imagined, and in the United States largest of all.
In April 1940 the American armed forces were hardly worth number-
ing. Five. Aprils later, as the Wehrmacht was breaking up, they had
taken on a dozen million which, added to the gains of the civilian sector,
had brought employment up altogether by 19.4 million (Table 2 A, line
1). Much was due to the absorption of many millions unemployed in
1940, but 11.5 million represented extra workers who had come in
during the five intervening years. Leaving out further the part due to
population growth, 8.5 million was the excess over the labor force that
would have prevailed if the population 14 and older had contributed the
same proportion of workers as in April 194054.1 percent.26 This
nation was in the enviable position of staffing one of the largest military
establishments in history and at the same time placing a sixth more
persons in civilian jobs than in 1940. Over half of the labor force addi-
tions were females, one for every three who would have been in gainful
work on the basis of prewar participation rates (Table 5).
These statistics were revised by the Census to be comparable to 1945. They mani-
fest an upturn in the proportion of the population in the labor force during 1940
and 1941. In the data underlying Occasional Paper /4 the increase was less (p. 50
and App. B), the discrepancy arising chiefly from the new technique which made
the July 1945 labor force nearly 2 million bigger. For comparability, the earlier data
were raised by the Census back to 1940, and the. above difference distributed in
such a way that the labor force was enlarged about a million more in April 1943
than in March 1940 ('Labor Force, Employment and Unemployment in the United
States, 1940 to 1946', Current Population Reports, Series P-50, No. 2, Sept. 11,
1947, p. 9)
Table 5
Peak Excess of World War II Labor Force (including armed forces) over Prewar
or Early War (millions of workers)
U. S. G. B. Canada Germany
April 1,June 1,June 1, May 1,1943d
J945fl J943b 1945° A B C
A BOTH SEXES 14 AND OLDER
Actual number
Both sexes 66.3 25.2 5.3 . 41.539.946.1
Males 46.4 16.7 4.2 26.7 25.129.8
Females 19.9 8.5 1.1 14.814.816.3
Excess, mci. rise due to
population growth
Bothsexes 11.5 2.3 0.7 1.0—0.6 5.3
Males 5.5 0.7 0.4 0.8—0.8 3.7
Females 6.0 1.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.6
Excess, excl. rise due to
population growth
Both sexes 8.5 1.8 0.4 —0.1—1.7 4.2
Males 3.8 0.3 0.3 0.1—1.6 3.0
Females 4.7 1.5 0.1 —0.2—0.1 1.2
34B MAJOR AGE-SEX EARNING GROUPS
Actual number
Males 25-64 33.5 11.9 2.8
Others 32.8 13.3 2.5
Young persons 14-24 16.7 7.0 1.6
Elderly persons 65+ 2.9 1.2 0.3
Women 25-64 13.2 5.1 0.6
Excess, mci. rise due to
population growth
Males 25-64 2.4 0.3 0.2
Others 9.1 2.0 0.5
Young persons 14-24 4.4 0.2 0.2
Elderly persons 65+ 0.7 0.4 0.1
Women 25-64 4.0 1.4 0.2
Excess, exci. rise due to
population growth
Males 25-64 0.5 0.0 0.0
Others 7.8 1.8 0.4
Young persons 14-24 4.6 0.3 0.2
Elderly persons 65+ 0.5 0.2 0.1
Women 25-64 2.7 1.3 0.1
Excess over April 1940. The United States mobilized a slightly larger labor force
inasmuch as 300,000 men were kIlled. Their inclusion would not alter the picture
materially.
bExcessover June 1939. For information on British parttime workers, military and
civilian war losses, and foreign workers and war prisoners, see Labor Force, Income,
and Employment) Appendix H.
Excess over June 1941. The Canadian labor force concept excludes student work-
ers and farm women employed on family farms. Canada mobilized a slightly larger
labor force than is reflected in these figures on active strength inasmuch as 40,000
were killed. Their inclusion would not alter the picture materially.
41Excessover May 1939. These data do not reflect some concealed possible shifts in
the German female labor force to the extent that 'agricultural helping wives' trans-
ferred to industry. The same shifts occurred in the United States but undoubtedly
some farm wives, who would be excluded from the United States or Canadian peace-
time labor force, were in the German labor force before the war and might, if their
peacetime work was trivial, constitute a real addition to the labor force without being
recognized in these statistics. However, no more than a few hundred thousand did,
in fact, shift from agriculture; and indication that females may not have worked
harder on their family farms is had in the fact that the exodus of German men from
farms was just about made up by foreign labor.
The actual labor force data are based upon a threefold classification:
A Labor force mobilized from native population, military losses not deducted;
civilian losses by May 1943 negligible.
B Labor force maintained in active strength from native population, military losses
deducted; civilian losses by May 1943 negligible.
C Labor force deducting military losses and counting foreigners and prisoners of
war; civilian losses by May 1943 negligible.
The labor force influx exceeded by far that of the. other three coun-
tries together even if foreigners are counted in the German work force
(Tables 1, 5). In percentages of working age population, however, ad-
ditions in Britain compare favorably to those in this country (Table 6).
Britain also drew more females 25-64 into its labor force, per 1,000
35of those ages in the population, despite smaller reserves. In alarger
sense Britain aroused its people most completely to action, for its peak
wartime labor force was a larger proportion of native population than
that of any of the other three countries.27 Germany lost from its native
labor force even if killed and missing are not deducted, and heavily if
they are.28 Only by including foreigners in the labor force can its addi-
tions be compared to those of the United States (Tables 5 and 6, A, col.
C).
WARTIME ADDITIONS BY AGE AND SEX EARNING GROUPS
No information was available on the age of the German labor force
during World War II. Detail on the other three countries (Tables 5,
6) elicits first that, aside from population growth, few additions were
drawn from males 25-64. Men 65 and older represented also, except in
Canada, a minor source, furnishing in the United States no more than
did males 25-64. Most of the extra labor came from young persons 14-
24 and women 25-64. The former was the source of over half of all
United States accretions, the latter, of nearly 40 percent; hardly more
than a tenth came from men of prime ages and the elderly together.
Most fresh manpower was thus, in fact, woman- and childpower. In
Canada one in every two entering the labor force during 1941-45 was
a youth. Women supplied the same number as elderly men. In Great
Britain young persons were among the least important additions, no
doubt because most children 14 or older were already gainfully occupied
in peacetime. Seven in every ten entrants were women 25-64.
Moreover, 47 percent of its workers in civilian nonagricultural industries, classified
by uses of products, were in war employments, compared with 38 percent in Canada
and 34 percent in this country. 'The Impact of the War on Civilian Consumption in
the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada', A Report to the Combined
Production and Resources Board, Morris A. Copeland, Chairman, September 1945,
pp. 152-6.
To show that Germany's failure to enlarge its labor force was due to other factors
than military losses one set of figures is presented in which the war dead are not
deducted. Incidentally, the failure to recruit native females puts figures quoted
during the war in an unfavorable light. According to uncitéd German sources in
The Economist (March 6, 1943, p. 300), 2.2 million women, including conscripts
for compulsory labor service and 'helpers' in the Wehrmacht, were brought into
employment from the labor reserve that existed in August 1939. "Thus, it is obvious
that only married women are available [in Germany] in large numbers. Married
women without children or with one child, have already been drawn into some kind
of war work... ."
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Peak Excess of World War II Labor Force (including armed forces) per 1,000
Population of Similar Age and Sex
UnitedGreat
StatesBritainCanada Germany
April 1,June 1,June 1, May 1, 1943d
J945& f943b J945C A B .C
A BOTH SEXES 14 AND OLDER
Actual proportion
Both sexes 623 658 594 649639672
Males 879 916 909 861853874
Females 370 423 265 449449473
Excess over prewar proportion
Both sexes 82 47 46 0—10 2!
Males 70 19 55 2 —6 14
Females 96 73 42 —4 —4 19
BMAJOR AGE-SEX EARNING GROUPS
Actual proportion
Men 25-64 958 974 970
Others 459 509 411
Young persons 14-24 639 872 646
Elderly persons 65+ 289 260 378
Women 25-64 374 377 218
Excess over prewar proportion
Men 25-64 18 3 10
Others 111 66 66
Young persons 14-24 176 43 91
Elderly persons 65+ 43 50 111
Women 25-64 91 102 42
See Table 5, notes.
5WEAKNESS OF GERMAN MANPOWER POLICY EXPLAINED
The failure of Germany to augment its labor force with citizens calls
for careful scrutiny, especially in view of the Nazis' supposed dictatorial
advantage and reputation for total warfare. We must be sure, first, that
it was not because civilians were stricken by bombing or sent out to
conquered territories.
Emigration can be disposed of fairly quickly. "According to a slogan
coined by Chancellor Hitler and frequently repeated by National So-
cialist leaders, 'the conquests of the German sword must be consolidated
by the plough'. The German victories throughout Europe did not, how-
ever, lead to any appreciable volume of German settlement apart from
the resettlement of Germans abroad. .Thereare, of course, millions
of Germans from the Reich in the territories conquered, annexed, or oc-
cupied by Germany, but the overwhelming majority of them are directly
connected with the military operations" (p. 27). "The number of Ger-
mans working abroad in commercial undertakings should not be over-
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